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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JENNIFFER MARIE SEVERIN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_______________________________)

NO. 44728
Teton County No. CR-2015-268
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Has Severin failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
Rule 35 motion request for leniency?
ARGUMENT
Severin Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
During the course of a physical fight while the two were intoxicated, Jenniffer M. Severin

hit her husband John with an aluminum T-ball bat. (PSI, pp. 4-5.) The state charged Severin
with felony domestic battery resulting in a traumatic injury and misdemeanor counts of
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possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 12-13.) Severin pled guilty to
the felony pursuant to a plea agreement whereby the state dismissed the two misdemeanors. (R.,
pp. 36-40.) The district court imposed a sentence of six years with two years determinate and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 46-51.) The court later relinquished its jurisdiction. (R., p. 57.)
Severin did not appeal from the initial judgment or the order relinquishing jurisdiction. (See
generally, R.)
Severin filed a Rule 35 motion within 120 days of entry of the written order relinquishing
jurisdiction. (R., pp. 59-63.) The district court denied the motion. (R., pp. 69-70.) Severin filed
a notice of appeal timely from the order denying her Rule 35 motion. (R., pp. 72-73.)

B.

Standard Of Review
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho 177, 180, 369 P.3d
955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007).

C.

Severin Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
The district court concluded that the rehabilitation it had hoped at the time of sentencing

would happen was “in process of happening.” (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 19-21.) Based on the evidence
presented in support of the Rule 35 motion, the district court concluded that “incarceration and
treatment is accomplishing exactly what the Court hoped it would.” (Tr., p. 21, Ls. 19-22.) The
question, then, was whether rehabilitation that was “working out the way you hope [it] would”
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was “a reason to change anything.” (Tr., p. 21, Ls. 22-24.) The district court ultimately
concluded that rehabilitation consistent with what the court hoped to achieve when it imposed
sentence was not a reason to change the sentence. (Tr., p. 26, L. 5 – p. 27, L. 12.)
In reaching this conclusion the court specifically considered the effect of Severin being
separated from her son. (Tr., p. 21, L. 25 – p. 22, L. 15.) It specifically considered her support in
the community. (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 16-20.) However, the district court had “concerns” over granting
the requested relief. (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 21-22.)
The district court, although it did not want it to be the emphasis of its ruling, noted factors
that indicated a sentence of incarceration was called for, including the facts the offense was
serious because it was an act of violence, Severin perpetrated the violence with her son present,
and Severin received an “appalling report” regarding her rider that resulted in the relinquishment
of jurisdiction. (Tr., p. 22, L. 23 – p. 24, L. 3.) The district court stated that it appeared that
since then Severin had made progress, but expressed “concern” that granting the motion would
“halt the programming that she’s receiving right at a time when she’s getting what she needs the
most and it appears to be effective.” (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 4-13.) Some of the programming she was
receiving was not scheduled to be completed until the following February and April, which
coincided with considerations for parole, and the court was “very reluctant to do anything” that
would prevent her from getting the full benefit of that programming. (Tr., p. 24, L. 14 – p. 25, L.
14.) The district court reviewed again the application of the probation factors in I.C. § 19-2521
and concluded the “fact that the defendant is doing better now doesn’t change” the finding that
Severin was not ready for probation because she was “on target” for rehabilitation but “not quite
there yet.” (Tr., p. 25, L. 15 – p. 26, L. 4.)
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The district court’s factual findings and application of the law to those facts show that the
denial of the Rule 35 motion was within the court’s discretion. It specifically considered the new
evidence in light of the evidence, factual findings, and sentencing decisions previously made and
concluded that although the indications of rehabilitation were a definite positive, they did not
show that a reduction of the sentence was appropriate.
On appeal Severin argues that the district court “did not reach its decision … through an
exercise of reason because it did not adequately consider the information” submitted with the
motion. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) This argument does not withstand analysis.
The evidence submitted included a letter by Severin attached to the motion (R., pp. 6263) and three letters submitted at the hearing, one by Severin’s son and two by supporting
members of the community (Defendant’s Exhibits A, B and C).

Severin also addressed the

court. (Tr., p. 19, L. 8 – p. 20, L. 9.) The district court specifically addressed all of the evidence
presented. (Tr., p. 21, L. 25 – p. 22, L. 15 (addressing evidence regarding son); p. 22, Ls. 16-20
(addressing evidence of community support); (Tr., p. 24, L. 4 – p. 25, L. 14 (addressing evidence
regarding progress in programming).) Severin has failed to show that the sentence was excessive
in light of the new information. That Severin believes the district court should have reached
different conclusions on the basis of this evidence does not show an abuse of discretion.
The district court considered the evidence presented in support of the Rule 35 motion and
concluded that it showed the type of progress the district court had hoped for when it imposed
sentence, but that achieving the hoped-for rehabilitative progress did not warrant reducing the
sentence, especially where granting the requested reduction would put the very progress achieved
in jeopardy. The district court’s decision was well within its discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order denying
Severin’s Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 29th day of August, 2017.

____/s/_Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.
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